Tim P. Bennett, Dale R. Bennett, and Bennett and Economy Sanitation Incorporated v. Grant S. Huish, and Utah Funding And Loan, Inc : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Tim P. Bennett, Dale R. Bennett, and Bennett and
Economy Sanitation Incorporated v. Grant S.
Huish, and Utah Funding And Loan, Inc : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Chris L. Schmutz; Schmutz & Mohlman.
Gerry B. Holman; Winder & Haslam.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bennett v. Huish, No. 20050499 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5832
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT STATE OF UTAH 
TIM P. BENNETT, DALE R. BENNETT, and 
BENNETT AND ECONOMY SANITATION, 
INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GRANT S. HUISH, and UTAH FUNDING 
AND LOAN, INC., 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appellate Case No.: 20050499-CA 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Oral Argument Requested 
Chris L. Schmutz 
SCHMUTZ & MOHLMAN, LLC 
533 West 2600 South #200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
GERRY B. HOLM AN, 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
(801) 322-2222 
FILED 
UTAHAPPELLATF 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT STATE OF UTAH 
TIM P. BENNETT, DALE R. BENNETT, and 
BENNETT AND ECONOMY SANITATION, 
INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GRANT S. HUISH, and UTAH FUNDING 
AND LOAN, INC., 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appellate Case No.: 20050499-CA 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Oral Argument Requested 
Chris L. Schmutz 
SCHMUTZ & MOHLMAN, LLC 
533 West 2600 South #200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
GERRY B. HOLM AN, 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
(801) 322-2222 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION „ 1 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
ADDITIONAL FACTS MARSHALED IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION 12 
FACTS SHOWING FLAWS IN TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 13 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 16 
ARGUMENT 17 
POINT 1. THE STATUTE OF FPAUDS REQUIRES ESCROW 
AGREEMENTS TO BE IN WRITING 17 
POINT 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING PAROL 
EVIDENCE REGARDING WHETHER $27,955.98 WAS 
SUBJECT TO AN ESCROW ARRANGEMENT 20 
POINT 3. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS 
OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 23 
POINT 4. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS 
OF CONVERSION 26 
POINT 5. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE 
UNWARRANTED, EXCESSIVE, AND VIOLATE 
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
AND OTHER RIGHTS 27 
POINT 6. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST 29 
i 
POINT 7. HUISH IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS IN 
THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 30 
CONCLUSION 30 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Brown v. Richards, 
840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 24 
Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) 29 
C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 
896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 2 
Campbell v. State Farm, 
98 P.3d 409, 414 (Utah 2004) 27,29 
Dowling v. Bullen, 
94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004) 1,2 
EIE v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 
638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) 23 
Fisher v. Fisher, 
907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 17,19 
Gemini Equipment Co. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 
595 A.2d 1211, 1215 (Pa. 1991) 22 
Guaranty National case, 
769 P.2d 269, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 28 
Henry v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 
459 A.2d 772, 776 (Pa. Super. 1983) 21 
Hernandez v. Baker, 
104 P.3d 664, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 30 
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
402 N.E.2d 857 (111. App. 1980) 19 
James Constrs., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 30 
iii 
Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
78 P.3d 988, 992 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 26 
Klinger v. Kightly, 
889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 29 
Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 
845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 26 
Miguel v. Belzeski, 
70 F.3d 1274, 1995 WL 704769 (7th Cir 1995) 19 
Nelson v. Jacobson, 
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) 28 
Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 
905 P.2d 901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 25 
Saunders v. Sharp, 
840 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1994) 21 
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 
82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003) 2 
Smith v. Osguthorpe, 
58 P.3d 854, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) 21 
Spears v. Wan, 
AA P.3d 742,750 (Utah 2002) 1 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 12 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995) 18 
iv 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571 12 
Black's Law Dictionary p. 545 (6th ed. 1990) 18 
v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellants/Defendants are Grant S. Huish and Utah Funding and Loan, Inc. 
(collectively referred to hereafter as "Huish"). Appellees/Plaintiffs are Tim P. Bennett, 
Dale R. Bennett, and Bennett and Economy Sanitation, Inc. (collectively referred to 
hereafter as "Bennetts"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the statute of frauds requires an escrow agreement to be in writing 
and whether the alleged oral statements in this case constituted an escrow agreement that 
had to be in writing to be enforceable. (R. 99-101; 153-156) 
Standard of Review. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See Dowling 
v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004). 
2. Whether the trial court erred by considering parol evidence contrary to the 
plain meaning of closing statement (Exhibit 102, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). (R. 
100; Trial Transcript, pp. 3,45 "hereafter "Tr."). 
Standard of Review. Whether to admit parol evidence is a question of law, that is 
reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 750 (Utah 2002). Facts regarding 
1 
whether the parties adopted a writing as a complete integration of their agreement are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. 
3. Whether the elements for breach of fiduciary duty were met. (R. 101; 161-
62). 
Standard of Review. Whether a party breached a fiduciary duty is a mixed 
question of law and fact where the trial court is granted ample discretion. C & Y Corp, v. 
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
4. Whether Plaintiff established all the elements for conversion. (R. 103; 162). 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusion of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness. Bowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004). 
5. Whether punitive damage were unwarranted, excessive, and a violation of 
Appellant's constitutional due process rights. (R. 103; 158-160). 
Standard of Review. Whether punitive damages are excessive is reviewed de 
novo. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003). 
6. Whether Huish is personally liable for acts in the course and scope of his 
employment. (R. 162). 
Standard of Review. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Bowling v. 
Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. On or about October 1, 2003, Bennetts filed suit 
against Huish alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of express trust, imposition of 
constmctive trust, conversion, fraud, and punitive damages, alleging they were entitled to 
2 
a $27,955.98 plus attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The basis for the 
complaint stems from alleged statements made by Huish that he would hold $27,955.98 
from the $70,000 hard money commercial loan ("Waterpro loan") for the benefit of 
Bennetts to either pay extension or interest fees on a previous $1,200,000 hard money 
loan ("Beck Street loan") that had fallen into arrears, or to return the $27,955.98 to the 
Bennetts by December 2000. (R. 1-6) 
B. A one day bench trial was held before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on 
February 24, 2005. 
C. The trial court issued a memorandum decision on February 25, 2005 
holding Bennetts were entitled to judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion in 
the amount of $18,643.98 plus statutory interest from December 1, 2000 through the date 
of judgment. The court also decided Bennetts were entitled to $50,000 in punitive 
damages. Judgment was entered on or about March 15, 2005. A Motion for a New Trial 
or to Alter or Amend Judgment was filed March 21, 2005 and after being fully briefed, 
the court issued a Ruling and Order entered May 2, 2005 that denied the Motion for a 
New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment. (R. 242) 
D. Notice of Appeal was filed on June 1, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. Plaintiffs operated a sanitation business with their father to pick up liquid 
wastes such as septic tanks, garage sumps, kitchen waste sumps, etc. (R. 126; Tr. p. 16). 
1
 The trial court's Findings of Fact are found at R. 126-135 and attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B"). 
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2. Tim and Dale Bennett took over the family sanitation business and in 1999 
and 2000 began looking for property to house their businesses, including a dewatering 
site to process the wastes. (Tr. p. 18). 
3. Bennetts located a commercial property at 1398 North Beck Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84116 ("Beck Street property") that would provide them desired space 
for expansion of their business to become more profitable. (R. 126; Tr. p. 18). 
4. Dale Bennett contacted his son and daughter-in-law who were real estate 
agents through Mansell realtors. They found out the asking price of the subject property 
was $1.5 million dollars. (Tr. p. 19). 
5. Bennetts then negotiated and agreed upon a sales price of $ 1.2 million 
dollars and then began trying to acquire a loan for the property. (Tr. pp. 19 and 20). At 
the time, Plaintiffs had approximately $80,000 in the bank. (Tr. p. 20). 
6. Plaintiffs contacted Kary Austin, who is a loan broker, to try to find a loan 
for them. (R. 127; Tr. p. 21). 
7. Because the Beck Street property was soon to be sold at a tax sale, Ms. 
Austin contacted Grant Huish to assist in locating a short term "hard money" bridge loan 
at less favorable interest rates. (R. 127; Tr. p. 21). 
8. Plaintiffs entered into a commercial loan agreement with Robert Kent of 
UTCO Associates, Ltd., on or about May 1, 2000, for $1,200,000 which was brokered, by 
Grant S. Huish of Utah Funding and Loan. The loan was secured by Trust Deeds on 
several properties owned by Plaintiffs. (R. 108; Exhibit 107). Huish brought the 
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documents to the closing and he directed the disbursement of the loan proceeds. (R. 
109). 
9. The 1.2 million dollar loan could be characterized as a "hard money" loan 
because it bore higher interest rates and fees than a traditional loan from a bank or other 
lending institution given the increased risk and circumstances of the loan. (Tr. 147). 
10. Mr. Huish was one of several loan brokers contacted by Kerry Austin of 
Discovery Mortgage to try and fund a loan to Bennett & Economy Sanitation. Bennetts 
paid some brokers in advance for their efforts to secure a loan (see Exhibit 112), although 
no advance fees were paid to Huish. (Tr. 89). 
11. For services in finding a lender and brokering the loan, Huish received 
commissions, origination fees, brokers fees, and loan points in the amount of $72,500.00, 
representing approximately 6% points on the $1,200,000 loan. Discovery Mortgage 
received 1% point or $12,000 for their role in the loan process. See Exhibit 10. 
12. Tim Bennett, Jr. and Amanda Bennett (the son and daughter-in-law of Tim 
Bennett) acted as realtors on the $1.2 million purchase of property and received real 
estate commissions of $78,000 through Mansell & Associates. (Tr. 68; Exhibit 114). 
13. On May 1, 2000, Bennetts entered into a loan agreement for $1.2 million 
bearing interest at 18% per annum that accelerated to 36% on default. The loan also 
carried a 10% penalty for late payments. The Promissory Note called for monthly 
payment of $ 18,000. See Promissory Note Exhibit 106. 
14. The 1.2 million dollar Beck Street loan closed on May 1, 2000 in Inwest 
Title. The closing was the first time Huish met the Bennetts. The terms of the loan were 
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90 days at 18% interest with default rate of 36% and late payment penalty of 10% of the 
principle balance of the loan. (R. 127-28). Bennetts did not find the loan terms 
acceptable but ultimately agreed, after consultation with their realtor, Dale Bennett, Jr., 
and because of representations by Huish, to close the loan. Huish represented he had a 
long term loan that could be closed before the maturity date of the hard money loan, 
although there was no guarantee of the replacement note and Bennetts signed an affidavit 
of no take out indicating no replacement loan was committed by UTCO. (R. 128). 
15. Dale Bennett testified the Bennetts wanted the Beck Street property 
because the price negotiated would provide Bennetts with $150,000 to $200,000 of 
instant equity. (Tr. 63-64; 65). 
16. At the time Plaintiffs consummated the $ 1.2 million loan, the signed an 
"Affidavit of No Takeout Commitment" that stated: 
We (I), The Undersigned, BEING DULY SWORN, DEPOSE and 
say that we (I) understand that there exists NO FUTHER 
COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF UTCO Associates LTD, OR 
ANY OF ITS LENDERS to provide a 'takeout' loan to pay off the 
loan we (1) are receiving this day. The loan must be paid off from 
OUR own efforts and not those of UTCO Associates LTD, or its 
lenders. UTCO Associates LTD, may provide such assistance, but at 
our request." See Exhibit 113. 
Furthermore, Kary Austin testified the affidavit of no take out means there was no 
replacement loan guaranteed. (Tr. 126). 
17. Tim Bennett testified Huish told him he guaranteed a replacement loan as 
follows: 
Q. What changed your mind? 
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A. Mr. Huish's guarantee that he had the loan secured for us, long-term and 
it would definitely close within 30, no more than 45 days. 
Q. Do you remember what Mr. Huish told you particularly? 
A. That it would not take - it - there was not enough time before the tax 
sale to do all the paperwork, it would take an additional 30 days, 
absolutely no longer than 45 days to close the long-term loan. So I 
would receive money back from the original payments. (Tr. 23). 
18. Those present at the closing table on the $1,200,000 commercial loan were 
Tim Bennett, Tim Bennett, Jr., Amanda Bennett, Dale Bennett, Kary Austin, and Grant 
Huish. (Tr. 72). Kary Austin (the loan broker from Discovery Mortgage who referred 
the Bennetts to Huish) testified "He told them he had a replacement loan but there's no 
guarantee." (Tr. 119). Austin also testified: 
Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Huish told the Bennetts at the closing that 
he could not guarantee the loan that he said he had for them? 
A. No. 
Q. He did not say that? 
A. No. 
Q. He just told them he had a loan? 
A. Right 
Q. You were aware that there's no guarantees on things like that 
because of your experience? 
A. Right. (Tr. 123). 
Further, Huish testified "I could never make such a guarantee on that type of transaction." 
Huish. (Tr. 154). 
19. Huish represented to the Bennetts that UTCO, the lender, required three 
checks made out at closing in the amounts of $18,000 dated June 1, July 1, and August 1, 
payable to UTCO. (R. 129). 
20. Although Plaintiffs made timely interest payments on the $1.2 million 
dollar loan, they were not able to make the balloon payment on August 1, 2000 as called 
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for by the Note. On or about August 2, 2000, Plaintiffs paid $ 18,000 for extension fee, of 
which 1% point or $12,000 was paid to UTCO (see Ex. 103) and lA% point or $6,000 
went to Utah Funding. See Ex. 2. Huish negotiated the extension fee by authority from 
UTCO. (R. 129). The check was made out to Utah Funding at the request of Huish. (R. 
129). The trial court found Huish owns and controls Utah Funding and Loan. (R. 130). 
21. The trial court's finding of fact 8 (R. 130) states "nothing was said at 
closing of the loan about defendants receiving any such fees. The court finds that the 
parties did not discuss that Huish would retain any commission as part of that extension 
process when the extension was discussed." (R. 130). Kary Austin testified she did not 
recall Huish informing the Bennetts he would be receiving additional fees for the rollover 
or extensions to) UTCO. (Tr. 115-116). Although Finding of Fact 8 states "nothing was 
said at closing of the loan about defendants receiving any such [extension or rollover] 
fees" Tim Bennett admitted Huish told him UTCO would charge extension fees. 
Q. He explained to you that there would be extension fees if the loan 
was not paid off within the 90 day time period provided in the note, 
correct? 
A. He explained to me that UTCO would charge me extension fees. 
UTCO. 
Q. Didn't he also explain to you that Utah Funding would also receive 
extension fees? 
A. No, he did not. It was UTCO and UTCO only was, to my 
knowledge was the ones that received the fees. (Tr. 72). 
22. The trial court found Huish failed to fully disclose that he would take a 
commission based on work in obtaining that extension. (R. 130). However, the Bennetts 
proposed finding of fact 10 admitted "At the closing, Grant Huish described the terms of 
the proposed $1,200,000 loan to the Plaintiffs. The following terms, among others, were 
8 
discussed: the loan must be repaid in full within 3 months; the interest rate would be 
18%; monthly interest payments of $18,000 would need to be made; if the loan was not 
repaid in a timely fashion, interest would increase to 36%; and there would be loan 
extension fees to extend the due date of the loan beyond three months." (Bennetts 
proposed Finding of Fact, ]f 10; R. 107) (emphasis added). 
23. Huish later advised Bennetts to further reduce the UTCO loan principal and 
Bennetts mortgaged another property and obtained $93,308, and paid UTCO $74,308 
with approximately $40,000 toward principal reduction, $19,000 for extension fees, and 
$14,000 for interest. The trial court found Huish had a duty to disclose he was taking 
$19,000 for the extension fees and $14,000 for interest. (R. 131). 
24. In October and November of 2000, the parties stipulated and the court 
found Huish was involved in obtaining a long term loan with Bank of Utah in Ogden as 
evidenced by the proffer of testimony from Carrie Fullerton (Tr. 145). At about the same 
time, Plaintiffs contacted Grant Huish of Utah Funding about another "hard money" loan 
in order to bring the $1.2 million dollar loan current. Mr. Huish secured another lender, 
Waterpro, Inc., to loan $70,000.00 to Plaintiffs to bring the $1.2 million dollar loan 
current. (Tr. 158-59). 
25. On or about November 3, 2000, a loan was consummated between 
Plaintiffs and Waterpro, Inc., that was due January 3, 2001. The terms of the Waterpro 
loan were 16% interest accelerating to 36% upon default, with 10% penalty for late 
payments. See Exhibit 100. As a result of this loan, the $1.2 million dollar loan was 
brought current and Plaintiffs' received net proceeds of $20,674.92 after paying loan 
9 
points, fees, prepaid interest, origination fees and brokerage fees to Utah Funding. See 
Exhibit 102. 
26. As a result of the $70,000.00 Waterpro loan, Utah Funding and Loan 
received loan points, document prep fees, origination fees, commissions and fees of 
$5,350, or approximately 7.64% of the loan amount. 
27. Funds disbursed from the $70,000 Waterpro loan to bring the $1.2 million 
dollar Beck Street loan current included the following: 
Disbursements for Borrower 
To: Utah Funding and Loan $27,955.98 
For: 30 day Loan extension Beck 
Street 
To: Synergetics $13,977.99 
For: Interest payment Beck Street 
(Ex. 103) 
The first disbursement to Utah Funding & Loan of $27,955.98 equals 3% of 
$931,844, which was the remaining principal balance of the loan at that time. 
28. There was no evidence, written or otherwise, of any agreement that the 
$27,955.98 paid to Utah Funding was to be held in escrow to make future loan extension 
payment(s). The $27,955.98 amount that is the subject of this lawsuit by Plaintiffs 
represents 3% points of the remaining balance of the $1.2 million loan (which was 
$931,844 at that time (see Ex. 103)), of which 1% point or $9,314.00 went to UTCO 
Associates, Ltd. (see Ex. 103) and the remaining 2% points or $18,628.00 went to Utah 
Funding & Loan and Huish Company. The disbursement of $13,977.99 is interest of 
10 
1.5% (18% annually) on the outstanding principal balance of $931,844. See Exs. 10 & 
103. 
29. Kary Austin testified brokers of hard money loans operate differently than 
brokers of traditional loans and the brokers on hard money loans have more involvement 
with extension fees and so forth. (Tr. 125). 
30. Plaintiffs were disbursed $20,674.92 from the second loan after the 1.2 million 
dollar loan was brought current. See Exhibit 102. 
31. Eventually, Bennetts once again were not able to make the balloon payment and 
were informed in a letter dated December 7, 2004 from UTCO Associates, LTD, the loan was in 
default. See Exhibit 108. When no long term loan was forthcoming, UTCO, through Huish, 
advised Bennetts there would be a $50,000 rollover or extension fees, and the court found, 
contrary to Huish's testimony, it was Huish' decision to set that amount. (R. 133). 
32. Plaintiffs signed its bankruptcy Statements & Schedules upon which the 
following language was prominently printed: "Penalty for making a false statement or 
2
 As Huish states in his affidavit, he did not set the extension fee in the amount of 
$50,000. Bob Kent of UTCO, who is now deceased, instructed Huish to demand $50,000 
for an additional extension. (R. 174-76). There was not even any testimony alleging 
Huish set $50,000 as the extension fee amount rather than Robert Kent of UTCO. 
Neither Tim Bennett, Amanda Bennett, or Kary Austin said anything in Court calling into 
question whether or not the $50,000 amount demanded for an extension fee came from 
Bob Kent. The lender, UTCO, after agreeing to 4 months extensions on the large $1.2 
million dollar loan, had the right to demand whatever it wanted for an extension fee or to 
begin foreclosure. Forbearance to avoid foreclosure is not free. 
Finally, this Court's finding that Huish was an "insider" with UTCO is incorrect. 
As explained in Huish's affidavit (R. 180-83), Huish has no ownership in UTCO and in 
fact UTCO has initiated foreclosure on Huish's house, and that foreclosure is still 
pending. 
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concealing property; Fine of up to $500,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years or both. 
18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571." (Ex. 112). 
ADDITIONAL FACTS MARSHALED IN SUPPORT 
OF TRIAL COURT'S DECISION3 
33. Dale Bennett never completed high school nor did he obtain an equivalency 
degree for high school. (Tr. p. 16). Tim Bennett, Sr., dropped out of school after the 8th 
grade to go to work. Dale Bennett finished the 11th grade and then was drafted into the 
Army. Plaintiffs are not sophisticated businessmen and had no previous dealings with 
loan brokers other than through purchasing their homes. (R. 108). 
34. Dale Bennett owned six other properties in addition to his home and his 
brother's home at the time they entered into the $1.2 million dollar Beck Street loan. An 
estimate of the amount of equity in those properties as of April 2000 was right around 
$500,000. (Tr. p. 20). Bennetts lost the equity in those properties. 
35. The loan Mr. Huish described at closing was not what Defendants expected 
in that it was a ninety (90) day loan at 18% interest rather than a twelve (12) month loan 
at 10% interest. (Tr. p. 22). Dale Bennett testified Mr. Huish guaranteed he had a long-
term loan secured that would definitely close within 30-45 days thereafter. (Tr. p. 23). 
3
 Although it is Huish's contention the primary bases for reversal of the trial court's 
decision are issues of law regarding whether an escrow agreement must be in writing and 
whether parol evidence should have been considered, where alternative theories for 
reversal address the trial court's findings of fact, Huish acknowledges his burden to 
marshal the evidence that supports the challenged findings and then show the same 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah Q. App. 1991). 
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36. Huish conceded he owed fiduciary duties to Bennetts in acting as their loan 
broker. (Tr. 173). Huish testified he fulfilled his fiduciary duties by disclosing the total 
amount of commissions, extension fees, but not an itemization or disclosure of the 
breakdown of who received the fees because such itemized disclosures were not required 
on commercial loans. (Tr. 173-74). 
FACTS SHOWING FLAWS IN TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
37. Prior to coming to Huish for the 1.2 million dollar loan, the Bennetts had 
applied for and been turned down for a commercial loan from Brighton Bank, at least in 
part, because the Bennetts did not have accurate bookkeeping records to process such a 
loan: 
Q. Mr. Bennett, can you tell me why that Brighton Bank people - I 
don't recall that you gave us a reason as to why they didn't get the 
loan put together. 
A. Because of the original books of the wrecking yard. 
Q. They weren't in order? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wouldn't that same issue be an impediment for anybody else to 
getting a loan? 
A. I was providing Mr. Huish an updated deal and he was aware, and 
the Brighton Bank people were contacted if I remember right in 
about September. 
Q. And did you ever get those financials in order after Brighton Bank 
turned you down? 
A. I was working with Mr. Huish on them. He had up to date good 
financials to work with. They was referring to the financials before I 
took possession. 
Q. But you didn't - you didn't have a complete set of financials to Mr. 
Huish at any time, did you? 
A. After I had taken possession, yes. 
Q. When was that? 
A. From May. They was talking prior to my possession. 
Q. I thought you said - okay, maybe I've got this wrong, but I thought 
you said that in August you went to Brighton Bank to get a loan? 
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A. It was either August or September - I believe it was more like 
September. 
Q. But they turned you down because you didn't have the proper 
financial statements to -
A. Prior to my possession of the wrecking yard. 
Q. Did you ever get those financial records they wanted put together? 
A. They was not available to be put together. 
Q. But my question to you if you didn't have the documents; to satisfy 
Brighton Bank, and that was the reason they turned you down, 
wouldn't it be important to get those documents together for 
anybody else to try and get a replacement loan? 
A. I put them together to the best of our ability. The documents I 
provided to Brighton Bank before our possession of the wrecking 
yard was too vague in their opinion. After we took possession of it, 
it was fine. Prior to us taking possession, in other words, the 
previous owner's records, not ours. 
Q. But you still - but it was still an impediment, a hurdle to getting a 
loan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that issue never was cleared up? 
A. Well, with Brighton Bank the issue was basically that they didn't 
have the money to make the commercial loan also. (Tr. 90-92). 
38. The Bennett complaint asserted "Huish told Plaintiffs that he and/or Utah 
Funding would hold $27,955.98 from the proceeds of the Loan (the "Money"), for the 
benefit of Plaintiffs, either to pay interest or extension fees on another loan owed by 
Plaintiffs, or to be returned to Plaintiffs by early December, 2000." (R. 2). Further, 
Bennetts prayer for relief sought $27,955.98 plus interest, attorney fees and costs. (R. 6). 
39. At trial, however, Tim Bennett admitted that although their complaint 
sought $27,955.98 based upon Huish's alleged oral promise to hold all $27,955.98 in 
escrow to be returned to Bennetts at some unstated future time, at trial Dale Bennett 
acknowledged at least $9,314 of the $27,955.98 was properly used to pay extension fees 
to UTCO, the lender on the 1.2 million Beck Street loan. (R. 84-85). 
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40. Dale Bennett testified he talked to Huish on the telephone about the 
$27,955.98 at issue in this case although he never sent Huish a letter and did not have his 
lawyer send a demand letter for an accounting or refund of $27,955.98. (Tr. 107). 
41. Although Bennetts allege in their Complaint that the $27,955.98 was to be 
returned to them by December of 2000, Mr. Huish never received any demand from 
Bennetts for the $27,955.98 or any other amount of money from the time the loan was 
taken out in November 2000 until the lawsuit was filed on or about October 6, 2003. 
(Tr.168). 
42. Bennett & Economy Sanitation Incorporated filed for Ch. 11 bankruptcy 
protection in December of 2000 (Tr. p. 87). On its Amended Schedule B—Personal 
Property (R. 112), Bennetts listed a $6,000 security deposit made to George E. Hall in St. 
George, Utah for 'loan brokering services." Tim Bennett testified he gave Mr. Bennett a 
$6,000 non-refundable deposit to try and put together a $1,200,000 loan for the Beck 
Street property. (Tr. p. 89). Because the Bennetts claimed they were entitled to this 
deposit back, they properly listed it on Schedule B. (Tr. 89). However, there was no 
listing of the $27,988.98 allegedly to be returned to the Bennetts from Huish on Schedule 
B or Amended Schedule B. If the Bennetts believed they were entitled to a return of all 
or part of this money, it would have been listed on the schedules. 
43. Huish testified he verbally disclosed his extension fees to the Bennetts 
which is evidenced by the checks made out to Huish. 
Q. Let me have you turn to Exhibit 103. And there is a - can you tell 
me where the first extension is reflected on Exhibit 103 on that 
ledger sheet from UTCO? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A, 
Q 
A 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q. 
A. 
August 2nd. 
And what's the amount on that? 
To UTCO was $12,000. 
Now that's not - they actually paid $18,000, correct? 
Correct. 
And who did they pay that to? 
They paid that to Utah Funding. 
And why did they pay that to Utah Funding? 
Because I negotiated and brokered that arrangement with the balloon 
being due with UTCO. 
And was that -
It's - Gerry, its as if I did a new loan for them. Their balloon was 
due, their balance was due It's as if we negotiated a new loan for 30 
more days. I would tell the Bennetts you have a 30 day extension. 
Instead of closing this loan again, paying title insurance, doing new 
deeds, we will accept a fee for $18,000 and extend that loan for 30 
more days. 
Is this the first hard-money loan that you've charged extension fees 
for yourself? 
No. 
How often - how prevalenl is that? 
All the time. 
What are the percentages for extension fees? 
That does vary. That's on what's negotiated between obviously Mr. 
Kent as the lender and the client being the Bennetts. Mr. Kent 
would say to me, okay, I need X amount of dollars to extend this 
loan. I would handle the negotiation with the Bennetts and I would 
be collecting a fee for handling of the extension of the loan. 
Did you disclose all that to the Bennetts? 
That's why the check was made out to me. (Tr. 156-57; see checks 
as Ex. 8). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case is about whether $27,955.98 as identified as a disbursement for a 
borrower on Exhibit 102 should have gone for loan commissions and points, or could be 
held in escrow and returned to Plaintiffs at some point in the future. Further, there were 
no terms of the escrow such as interest rate, deposit location, conditions upon return or 
the like. Any escrow agreement alleged by Bennetts must be in writing to be 
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enforceable. If, as Plaintiffs contended in their Complaint up to the time of trial, that 
$27,955.98 was to be returned to Defendants, it would have meant there was no penalty 
or cost for forbearance on the $1,200,000 loan. Even unsophisticated borrowers should 
realize that funds must be paid as consideration for forbearance to keep the lender from 
foreclosing. 
Further, Defendants contend there was not sufficient evidence to meet the 
elements necessary to prove conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Also, it was 
improper to hold Grant Huish personally responsible as he was at all time acting within 
the course and scope of his employment with Utah Funding and Loan, Inc. Finally, the 
imposition of punitive damages in this case was unwarranted and excessive. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES ESCROW AGREEMENTS TO 
BE IN WRITING 
This Court stated in Finding of Fact paragraph 14 
A valid escrow account or trust was not created as there was not 
writing to that effect. However, the Court does find that Plaintiffs 
were told that if that amount was needed it would be held by Utah 
Funding to pay for their extension fees or interest, or to pay 
commissions to Huish for his work in obtaining the long-term 
financing, then those funds would be used for that purpose. If the 
funds were not used for those purposes, they would be returned to 
Plaintiffs. 
Moreover, in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law, this Court acknowledged "an 
escrow agreement must be in writing." 
This Court has held conveyances or encumbrances of land and related escrow 
agreements are subject to the Statute of Frauds and must be in writing. In Fisher v. 
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Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court held in relation to a real 
estate transaction "under the Utah Statute of Frauds, the original escrow agreement was 
required to be in writing. See Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1995)." That is the law in 
Utah. Escrow is defined as follows: 
A legal document (such as a deed), money, stock, or other property 
delivered by the grantor, promisor, or obligor into the hands of a 
third person, to be held by the latter until the happening of a 
contingency or performance of a condition, and then by him 
delivered to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. A system of 
document transfer in which a deed, bond, stock, funds or other 
property is delivered to a third person to hold until all conditions in a 
contract are fulfilled; e.g. delivery of a deed to escrow agent under 
installment land sale contract until full payment for a land is made. 
Black's Law Dictionary p. 545 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). 
Bennetts alleged, and the trial court found, that Huish told Plaintiffs the 
$27,955.98 would be "held by Utah Funding to pay further extension fees or interest, or 
to pay commissions to Huish for his work in obtaining the long term financing, then those 
funds would be used for that purpose. If the funds were not used for those purposes they 
would be returned to plaintiffs." (R. 134; Finding of Fact, \ 14). Such an alleged oral 
"agreement" described in this Court's Finding of Fact constitutes an "escrow agreement" 
that must be memorialized in writing with all terms to be valid. Finding of Fact ]f 14 
describes an agreement where funds $27,955.98 would be held by Huish/Utah Funding to 
be used for certain alleged contingencies, and if those contingencies did not occur (i.e., 
further extension fees, interest, or commissions for long term loan) then the funds would 
be returned to Plaintiffs. All the Bennetts causes of action fail without a written escrow 
agreement. Otherwise, anyone who takes out a commercial loan could allege that just 
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about any item on a closing statement was to be held in escrow and returned if certain 
unstated conditions did or did not occur. 
The circumstances of this case are very similar to the case of Miguel v. Belzeski, 
70 F.3d 1274, 1995 WL 704769 (7th Cir 1995) (attached hereto as Exhibit "C") where the 
Plaintiff sued the Defendant for breach of fiduciary duty alleging that the delivery of cash 
as security for a bond was to be held in escrow with a deed to be returned if a bond was 
not forfeited. Id, at 3. The Miguel Court recognized the statute of frauds applies to 
escrow agreements and not just conveyances of land. Id. at 6. That is also the law in 
Utah. See Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176, supra. Moreover, the Miguel Court granted the 
Defendants motions for summary judgment and dismissed all claims holding: 
Plaintiffs can only prevail on their claim if they are able to prove the 
existence of some writing evidencing the alleged escrow arrangement with 
[the other party]. Even if Plaintiffs were able to prove the existence of an 
oral agreement, that would not be enough under the Statute of Frauds. 
There are reasons for the Statute of Frauds requirement. Without such a 
rule governing conveyances of land, parties to such transactions could 
attempt to unravel them many years later by alleging the existence of an 
oral agreement contradicting the absolute language of the deed itself. The 
trier of fact would have absolutely no way of ascertaining the substance of 
the agreement. 
Id. at 7. See also Hubbard v. Hubbard, 402 N.E.2d 857 (111. App. 1980) (Constructive 
trust denied where grantor allegedly conveyed property per her brother's oral promise to 
"make it right for her" because there was no valid written agreement to satisfy statute of 
frauds.). 
Indeed, the very purpose behind the Statute of Frauds is to prevent a fraud from 
happening. In other words, it would be fraudulent for a person to file suit or make a 
claim against a mortgage lender or broker years after a commercial loan was 
consummated because the owner alleged amounts identified as "points, commission, or 
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other fees" in a closing statement were to be held for some unwritten purpose and 
returned upon the happening or nonhappening of those unwritten contingencies. To 
allow a claimant to recover under such circumstances works a fraud upon Huish. 
In this case, Bennetts simply had buyer's remorse and they are attempting to 
unwind an agreement they knowingly entered into years ago. Because there is no writing 
to evidence of any escrow agreement for $27,955.98, $18,643.98, or any other amount, 
the claims for those funds fail as a matter of law whether the theory is conversion or 
breach of fiduciary duty. All of Plaintiffs theories are tied to the alleged oral promise by 
Huish to hold funds in escrow subject to certain contingencies and must fail if there is no 
writing for the escrow agreement related to this real property transaction. Because the 
funds went for extension fees as stated in the signed writing and not held in escrow 
pursuant to any writing, there can be no breach of fiduciary duty or conversion. 
Defendants are entitled to dismissal of all claims. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE 
REGARDING WHETHER $27,955.98 WAS SUBJECT TO AN 
ESCROW ARRANGEMENT 
The trial court erroneously allowed Tim Bennett to testify about alleged oral 
statements made by Huish about returning $27,955.98 to the Bennetts when the Closing 
Statement plainly disclosed why that amount was disbursed: 
Disbursements for Borrower 
To: Utah Funding and Loan $27,955.98 
For: 30 day Loan extension Beck 
Street (Ex. 102) 
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Parol evidence to alter or contradict a writing is not admitted unless the writing is 
ambiguous as a matter of law. Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1994). There 
is no ambiguity about what the $27,955.98 was to be disbursed for as the Closing 
Statement clearly stated it was for an extension on the Beck Street property loan that had 
fallen in arrears. It was improper to permit testimony that $27,955.98 was to be held in 
escrow for extension fees or returned to Plaintiffs under any circumstance or condition. 
Further, "to preserve the integrity of written contracts, we apply ca rebuttable 
presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is 
what it appears to be. m Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
The assertion by Plaintiffs that the Closing Statement was not an integrated 
agreement, and therefore, did not bar parol evidence is misplaced under the facts of this 
case. The Closing Statement stood on its own and did not reference any other 
documents. It was also signed by Dale Bennett and Tim Bennett. By its own terms the 
"Closing Agreement" detailed the final distribution of all monies involved in the 
transaction. It was not a preliminary agreement, letter of intent, or partial closing 
agreement. Every penny of loan funds was accounted for in the Closing Statement and 
nothing within the four comers of the document suggested any uncertainty, ambiguity, or 
contingency regarding any disbursement. 
The fact that there is no integration clause in the Closing Agreement does not 
mean there is an open door for testimony about alleged oral statements about the holding 
of funds. See Henry v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 459 A.2d 772, 776 (Pa. 
Super. 1983) (affirming summary judgment and barring evidence of alleged prior oral 
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representations pursuant the parol evidence rule upon finding that, even in the absence of 
integration clause, written loan agreement was complete as to subject matter). 
Furthermore, escrow agreements are commonly part of real property transactions 
and such escrow terms would be stated or referenced in a Closing Agreement. Because 
the escrow arrangement would normally be included or referenced in the Closing 
Agreement parol evidence should not be considered regarding an alleged escrow 
agreement that is nowhere mentioned in the closing document. See Gemini Equipment 
Co. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 595 A.2d 1211, 1215 (Pa. 1991) ("Parol evidence is not 
admissible to show an agreement which normally is found in the written instrument."). 
In Gemini the dispute involved an automobile lease that did not include a buy-out clause. 
The lessee wanted to introduce evidence of an oral buy-out agreement made 
contemporaneous with the time the lease was executed. The Gemini Court staled "[The 
lessee] contends that the parol evidence rule does not apply in this situation merely by the 
fact that the written lease agreement does not discuss the terms of a buyout. It is 
precisely this absence, however, which leads us to believe that such an agreement was 
never reached." Id. Likewise, in the case at bar, an escrow agreement or agreement to 
retain and possibly return funds is the type of matter that would normally be stated in an 
escrow agreement and included or at least referenced in a Closing Agreement is such an 
agreement really existed. The fact that there was no mention of such an escrow 
agreement, when it would normally be included, is the best indication that there was no 
such agreement. Accordingly, there should have been no testimony allowed about any 
22 
alleged escrow agreement and the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion 
must fail as a matter of law. 
Finally, the course of dealing of the parties is a good indicator of their intentions 
regarding whether an agreement is integrated or not. See EIE v. St, Benedicts Hospital, 
638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) (holding, in analyzing whether the parol evidence rule 
applies "the course of dealing of the parties gives some indication of their intentions"). 
In the case at bar, the earlier extension fees were made by paying checks to Utah Funding 
and Loan. (Ex. 8). Huish testified he disclosed his commissions for extension fees 
verbally to the Bennetts, and indeed, that is why some of the checks were made out to 
Utah Funding & Loan. (Tr. 157). Further, Bennetts admitted in the proposed findings of 
fact that Huish told them they would have to pay extension fees if the Beck Street loan 
fell in arrears. (R. 107). The documentary evidence therefore does not support the 
Bennetts version of an escrow arrangement, and those alleged facts, absent a writing, 
cannot support the trial court's decision. 
III. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
In order to establish a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, Bennetts must 
prove the following: 
To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a party must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) That the parties were 
engaged in a joint venture; (2) That one party took actions which 
benefited himself at the expense of the joint venture and which were 
inconsistent with the understanding of the parties or otherwise acted 
in a way inconsistent with the duties of loyalty, good faith, fairness 
and honesty owed by parties engaged in a joint venture to one 
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another; and (3) That as a result, the other party suffered damages." 
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Bennetts failed to prove or establish Huish took action to their benefit that was 
inconsistent with any joint venture or inconsistent with loyalty, good faith, fairness and 
honesty owed to parties in a joint venture. Again, Huish was entitled to extension fees 
for negotiating loan extensions and forbearance with the lender. Why else would Huish 
be involved in the extension process if not to earn fees for his services? 
There was no evidence Huish violated any statute, rule or regulation regarding 
disclosure of escrow fees on a commercial loan. The trial court concluded in paragraph 6 
of its Conclusions of Law, the extension fees may have been legitimate if they had been 
disclosed.4 (R. 137-38). However, there is no legal requirement for a breakdown of 
extension fees to be paid on a commercial loan. Federal regulation Z does not apply to 
commercial loans. (R. 173). 
In the $1.2 million Beck Street loan, the fees of $84,000 were disclosed on the 
closing statement without any breakdown indicating that Discovery Mortgage would 
receive one percentage point or $12,000. (Exhibit 105). How is that disclosure of the 
aggregate fee permissible but the similar aggregate disclosure of extension fee on the 
$70,000 Waterpro Loan improper? Bennetts acknowledge in their Proposed Findings of 
4
 This same paragraph of the Conclusions of Law also states "on three occasions Huish 
kept a commission and failed to advise Plaintiffs he was doing so." (R. 137). However, 
the Plaintiffs only claim was for the commissions that were part of the single 
disbursement of $27,955.98 from the $70,000 Waterpro loan, and the Complaint made no 
allegation of wrongdoing for previous commissions, disbursements or disclosures, and 
the statute of limitations had run on those disbursements (R. 159) and accordingly, the 
trial court's conclusions of law were not founded on appropriate legal basis. 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law and in their testimony at trial, that extension fees were 
disclosed by Huish at the time the $1.2 million Beck Street loan was consummated (Tr. 
72; R. 107) and they were also discussed as the due dates approached. (Tr. 82). Tim 
Bennett testified that although this made them somewhat nervous, they decided to go 
through with the loan, including payment of a $78,000 commission to Tim Bennett's son 
and daughter-in-law, and a 1% ($12,000) commission to Kary Austin at Discovery 
Mortgage. 
The $27,955 at issue in this case was fully disclosed to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs 
signed the closing statement acknowledging the extension fee was for a 30-day loan 
extension on the Beck Street property. "It is well established that one party to a contract 
does not have a duty to ensure that the other has a complete and accurate understanding 
of all terms embodied in a written contract. Each party has the burden to understand the 
terms of a contract before he affixes his signature to it and may not thereafter assert his 
ignorance as a defense." Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc. 905 P.2d 901, 906 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
Furthermore, Huish demonstrated their good faith and loyalty in the $70,000 
Waterpro loan in that Huish passed along the 16% interest rate, when the $1.2 million 
Beck Street loan bore an interest rate of 18%. Huish could have charged Bennetts 18% 
interest on the $70,000 Water Pro loan and Bennetts would have never known they could 
have gotten the loan for 16%. Rather than take advantage of the Bennetts, Huish passed 
along the benefit of the lower interest rate to the Bennetts. 
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IV. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF 
CONVERSION 
Huish also did not wrongfully convert any funds. "'A conversion is an act of 
willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person 
entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession . . . . Specifically, a party alleging 
conversion must show that he or she is entitled to immediate possession of the property at 
the time of the alleged conversion"' Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp, 78 P.3d 988, 992 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) (alterations in original); see also Lake Philgas 
Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
"To sustain an action for conversion, a party must prove that the act in question 
constituted can act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification 
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession.'"). 
The funds at issue in the amount of $27,955.98 were identified and disclosed as 
extension fees for Beck Street property and not to be held in escrow subject to unwritten 
contingencies. Accordingly, there has been no showing of wrongful conversion of funds 
by Huish. The funds at issue went to satisfy extension fees and commissions in order to 
obtain forbearance of the $1,200,000 hard money loan that had fallen in arrears. This 
was plainly and clearly disclosed on the Closing Statement (Ex. 102) attached hereto as 
Ex. A. There was no evidence beyond the alleged oral testimony that $27,955.98 or any 
part thereof was wrongfully withheld any time. Because there was no writing for the 
alleged escrow arrangement of the $27,955.98, there could be no breach or v/rongful 
possession of the funds. 
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V. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE UNWARRANTED, 
EXCESSIVE, AND VIOLATE DEFENDANTS5 CONSTITUTIONAL 
DUE PROCESS AND OTHER RIGHTS. 
Without any evidence of Huish's ability to pay or assets, this Court entered an 
order awarding punitive damages of $50,000. This amount was purportedly based upon 
extension fees obtained by Huish that were allegedly wrongful, although curiously, the 
$1.2 million Beck Street loan and its associated fees were considered legitimate. Even 
assuming that this disgorgement of extension fees is the appropriate basis for a punitive 
damage award, the Court's Order of $50,000 is not an accurate reflection of the fees 
obtained by Huish. Extension fees obtained by Huish were $6,000 on the first extension, 
$19,000 on the second extension, and $18,628.00 on the third extension for a total of 
approximately $43,628.00. 
The seven factors to consider in awarding punitive damages are: "(i) the relative 
wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and 
circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the 
plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the 
relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded." See 
Campbell v. State Farm, 98 P.3d 409, 414 (Utah 2004). Further, "reprehensibility is 
c[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.5" Id. 
One of the reasons given for the punitive damages that were more than twice the actual 
damages was that "No documents explained that an extension fee was being charged." 
(R. 137). However, that is not accurate as Ex. 102 identified $27,955.98 was disbursed 
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"To: Utah Funding and Loan For: 30 day Loan extension Beck Street." (Ex. 102; 
attached hereto as Ex. "A"). 
While the trial court stated it found Huish's conduct "most outrageous" (R. 139) 
there was no analysis or allegation that the conduct, even if true, was reprehensible. 
Moreover, while there arguably was analysis of the alleged misconduct, facts and 
circumstances, effect on Plaintiffs, and the relationship of the parties, there was no 
evidence of the relative wealth of Huish, the probability of future recurrence, or a 
justifiable and proportional relationship to the actual damages. Accordingly, the punitive 
damages award is not sufficiently supported and cannot stand—even if compensatory 
damages were upheld in this case. 
This Court determined that Huish are not guilty of fraud. It was interesting to note 
that in Guaranty National case, 769 P.2d 269, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court 
of Appeals held punitive damages are not intended as additional compensation to a 
Plaintiff and further, concluded fraud alone may not meet the threshold necessary to 
warrant punitive damages. Given that there is no basis to support a fraud claim against 
Huish in this case, it is difficult to understand how Huish 4s non-fraudulent conduct can 
warrant such a severe imposition of punitive damages. 
At a minimum, this case should be remanded to take evidence as to the Huish's 
financial situation or ability to pay punitive damages. In Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 P.2d 
1207 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that a punitive damage award of $25,000 
could not be sustained "because it was entered without adducing any evidence or making 
any findings of fact regarding Defendants' net worth or income." Id at 1219; see also 
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Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) (holding "in the absence of 
such evidence [as to Defendants' networth] the award of [punitive damages] can not be 
sustained."). Under these circumstances the punitive damage award is unwarranted and 
excessive. 
The $50,000 punitive damage award against Huish in this case violates the due 
process clause of the 14 Amendment, because the punitive damages were excessive. It 
is a fundamental principle of fairness and due process that a Defendant have the 
opportunity to address and be heard on all issues before a judgment is entered against it. 
This has not yet taken place in this case in that no evidence in ability to pay or financial 
standing has been heard, alleged, or even argued before this Court. This Court even went 
so far as to state in its award of $50,000 in punitive damages "the amount is probably 
very generous to Huish and could easily be more." That conclusion is speculation devoid 
of any evidentiary foundation whatsoever as there was no testimony or evidence on that 
issue. If allowed to stand, that conclusion violates Huish's constitutional rights to due 
process and their rights against excessive fines. See Campbell v. State Farm, 98 P. 3d 
409, 414 (Utah 2004). 
VI. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
A prevailing party is not automatically entitled to prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is only allowed where damages could be calculated with 
mathematical certainty beforehand. Klinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding prejudgment interest is not allowed "where damages are incomplete 
or cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty"). In this case, up until trial, 
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Bennetts contended they were entitled to $27,955.98 and nothing less. Not until trial did 
the actual compensatory damage amount get recalculated and determined by this Court. 
Under those circumstances no prejudgment interest is appropriate. See James Constrs., 
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing "when 
damages are uncertain or speculative until fixed by the factfinder, Utah courts have 
refused to award prejudgment interest"). 
VII, HUISH IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS IN THE COURSE 
AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
At all times relevant to the allegations, Huish acted in the course and scope of his 
employment with Utah Funding & Loan, Inc. Huish is entitled to the corporate shield 
defense and cannot be held personally liable. See Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664, 667 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting Plaintiffs argument "that the corporate shield defense 
does not apply to an intentional tort, including conversion . . . [holding] there is clear 
Utah authority to the contrary: "'An employer is liable for the torts of its employees that 
are committed within the scope of employment, even if the tortuous acts were 
intentional.'"). Even if a judgment is warranted, it should only be against Utah Funding 
& Loan, Inc. and not against Huish personally. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis to hold Huish liable for the judgment imposed by the trial court 
as the alleged escrow agreement described by Bennetts and the trial court was nowhere in 
writing, and as such, could not be enforced. Furthermore, the logic of Bennetts' 
argument for this money fails, as their testimony at trial is inconsistent with their 
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complaint in theory. Finally, because the court erroneously enforced an oral escrow 
agreement, there is no basis to sustain causes of action for conversion and breach of 
fiduciary duty and the associated punitive damages. Accordingly, Huish respectfully 
request an order from this Court reversing the decision of the trial court in its entirety. 
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WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
GERRY B. HOLMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by 
on the 2i^ day of November, 2005to the following: 
Chris L. Schmutz 
SCHMUTZ & MOHLMAN, LLC 
533 West 2600 South #200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(iSfXJ.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Hand-Delivered 
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Appraisal/Inspection Fees 
Title Insurance 
Application Fee 
Filing and Recording Fees 
Document Preparation Fees 
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Prepaid interest of 28 days 
Total Closing Costs 
$70,000.00 
$S,6O0.OO<^23 ^ ^ ?0O 
so.oo, 
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To: Utah Funding and Loan 
For: 30 dayLoan extension Beck-
SirSer 
$27,955.98 
$7391.11 
To: Synergetics $13,977.99 
For: Interest Payment Beck Street 
To: 
For: 
To: 
For: 
$0.00 
$0.00 
To: 
For: 
To: 
FOT: 
$0.00 
$0.00 
Total Disbursements: $41,933.97 
Check to Borrower: $20,674.92 
" -nnett* Fconomy Sanitation Inc. 
&^^ Tim P. Bennett 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM P. BENNETT, DALE R. 
BENNETT, and BENNETT and 
ECONOMY SANITATION, INC., 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
GRANT S. HUISH and UTAH FUNDING 
and LOAN, INC., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 030921876 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: February 25, 2005 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
February 24, 2005. Plaintiffs was present with and through Chris 
L. Schmutz and Defendants were present with and through Gerry B. 
Holman. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint on October 2, 2003. It alleged 
five causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) 
violation of express trust, (3) imposition of constructive trust, 
(4) conversion, and (5) fraud. The complaint in summary alleged 
defendants acted as an agent or broker for plaintiffs in 
obtaining a $70,000 loan. Plaintiffs allege that at closing in 
November, 2000, defendants stated about $28,000 from the loan 
proceeds would be held for plaintiffs, either to pay interest or 
extension fees on another loan owed by plaintiffs, or that amount 
would be returned to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that the 
money was not returned and was not used for the promised 
purposes. The complaint also seeks punitive damages on causes 
one, two, four and five. 
Defendants filed an answer on October 30, 2003, denying the 
essential allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses. 
Very little happened with the case and the court put the 
case on its order to show cause calendar for dismissal for 
October 20, 2004. Plaintiffs then filed a certificate of 
readiness and the matter was scheduled for trial. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs (the Bennetts) are brothers who ran a 
sanitation business. They are not well educated nor sophisticated 
in business matters. Tim Bennett dropped out of high school. 
Nevertheless, they have been able to work hard and establish a 
profitable business over many years. In approximately late 1999 
and early 2000 they desired to expand their business by adding 
another aspect to the sanitation business and beginning a salvage 
operation as well. They found a lot on Beck Street they desired 
to purchase. They used the services of one of their sons, a 
realtor, to negotiate a $1.2 million price from the offered 
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selling price $1.5 million. Plaintiffs believed if they could 
obtain that property they would immediately have equity in that 
property. They contacted a mortgage broker, Kary Austin, to 
assist in the effort to find funding for the purchase. 
2. Austin began to work on finding funding and in April 
2000, she and plaintiffs learned the lot was soon to be sold at a 
tax sale, so Austin began to look for what is called a "hard 
money" loan, at less favorable rates to plaintiffs, until a 
conventional permanent loan could be obtained. She contacted 
defendant Huish, with whom she had worked before, to obtain a 
lender for such a loan. Huish has been involved in brokering 
mortgages for fifteen years and has done many "hard money" loans. 
Austin and plaintiffs had desired a short term loan of 
approximately one year. The normal rate at that time was about 
18%. 
3. Defendant indicated to Austin he could find such a 
lender and then advised, on a short term notice, that he had a 
lender and the plaintiffs and Austin should meet at Inwest Title 
on May 2, 2000, to close the loan. In fact Huish had contacted a 
lender, Robert Kent, who did business as UTCO, with whom Huish 
had often done business of such a nature. The parties met for 
the first time there and Huish for the first time informed 
plaintiffs and Austin that the loan, with UTCO as the lender, was 
for 90 days at 18% with a default rate of 36% and a 10% of the 
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balance as a penalty for late payment. Up to that point neither 
plaintiffs nor Austin knew who the lender would be. The monthly 
payment under the note was $18,000. The loan was to be repaid by 
August 1, 2000, within three months. There were roll-over, or 
extension, fees, that were discussed but those are not described 
in the note. 
4. Because the tax sale was soon upcoming, plaintiffs had to 
decide whether to take that short term, or "bridge" loan or let 
the opportunity to purchase the property pass. Plaintiffs did 
not find the terms acceptable but determined, with consultation 
from their son and Austin, to undertake the loan based in major 
part on representations of Huish. Defendant indicated he had a 
long term loan that could be closed before the maturity date of 
August 1, 2000. No details were discussed about that purported 
loan and there was no "guarantee" of that loan, but Huish told 
plaintiffs he had a long term, replacement loan that would be 
'accomplished before August 1, and in fact, within the next 30-45 
days. At the closing plaintiffs also signed an affidavit of "no 
takeout commitment." That document stated that UTCO, the lender, 
made no commitment it would do anything to assist in the payoff 
of this short term loan. 
5. Based in major part on the representation of Huish 
plaintiffs signed the note and trust deeds. Three deeds of trust 
secured by the property on Beck Street, the property at 164 Helm 
4 
Ave, and a the property at 3648 South 200 East, properties owned 
by plaintiffs, were signed by plaintiffs, 
6. At the time of closing Huish advised that plaintiffs 
should not contact UTCO but only Huish. 
7. Huish stated that UTCO, the lender, required three checks 
in advance and shortly after closing plaintiffs wrote three 
separate checks, each in the amount of $18,000, dated June 1, 
July 1, and August 1, 2000, payable to UTCO. Huish told 
plaintiffs UTCO demanded that as the three interest payments in 
advance. From the loan proceeds, Huish obtained $72,500 and 
Austin $12,000 as commissions. 
8. Near August 1, 2000, though the parties had been talking 
and discussing the long term financing during June and July, no 
replacement or long term loan had been achieved. Plaintiffs were 
not able to make the balloon payment by August 1, 2000, and no 
one contemplated they would be able to make that payment without 
a long term replacement loan. Huish advised that an extension fee 
of $18,000 was required. That amount was set by Huish who had 
authority from UTCO to negotiate an amount to extend or roll over 
the loan. Huish testified that fee was set in consultation with 
UTCO but the court finds Huish set that fee based on a "standing" 
arrangement he had with UTCO. Plaintiffs gave a check to Huish, 
made out to Utah Funding at the request of Huish, in the sum of 
$18,000. The court finds Huish owns and controls Utah Funding and 
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Loan. Of that amount, Huish paid UTCO $12,000 and retained the 
remainder as his fee for negotiating the extension. Nothing in 
the note or trust deeds indicated Huish or Utah Funding would 
receive extension or roll over fees and nothing was said at 
closing of the loan about defendants receiving any such fees. The 
court finds that the parties did not discuss that Huish would 
retain any commission as part of that extension process when the 
extension was discussed. The court finds plaintiffs believed 
Huish was involved, and the court finds he was, in obtaining a 
long term loan and that Huish would be paid a commission for his 
efforts on that long term loan. The court finds Huish failed to 
fully disclose that he would take a commission based on work in 
obtaining that extension. That payment of the fee extended the 
due date on the balloon payment to September 1, 2000. The court 
bases that finding in part on the course of events that 
transpired with respect to other payments plaintiffs made as 
described below. The court finds plaintiffs more credible on 
this point based on several factors. Again, as described below, 
other payments were being made by plaintiffs toward principle and 
Huish testified he was not doing anything to further the long 
term loan, as that was not why he was hired. Huish did indicate 
he was involved in the long term loan in November, but the court 
finds he had represented he was involved long before that. The 
facts belie his assertion there was no involvement earlier. 
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Further, Huish testified he did not say to plaintiffs that he had 
a long term loan available and the court finds the weight of the 
evidence is contrary to that assertion. 
9. The parties had been talking in June and July about 
increasing the ability to obtain a long term loan and Huish 
suggested plaintiffs mortgage their other properties, including 
their homes, to reduce the principle amount of the loan with UTCO 
to make it a more attractive loan to a long term lender. 
Plaintiffs each mortgaged a property and provided Huish with two 
checks, approximately $113,000 and $114,000, which were applied 
to the UTCO loan principle in early August, 2000. The court finds 
plaintiffs would not have done that without the involvement of 
Huish, which involvement Huish denied. 
10. In ongoing discussions Huish told plaintiffs to further 
reduce the UTCO loan principal and plaintiffs mortgaged anotner 
property and obtained $93,308, from a loan and at the direction 
of Huish plaintiffs wrote a check in that amount to Utah Funding. 
Huish then paid UTCO $74,308 of that amount in September, 2000, 
with approximately $40,000 going toward a reduction of principal, 
$19,000 for the extension fee, and $14,000 for interest. The 
court finds that Huish had a duty to fully disclose that he was 
taking approximately $19,000 as a commission for extending the 
balloon payment date. While Huish understood what he was doing, 
and while it may be his normal practice, he did not tell 
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plaintiffs in a way that satisfied his fiduciary duty, which the 
court finds he had. Huish was involved in ongoing attempts to 
secure long term financing, or at least plaintiffs so believed 
because Huish had told them he was so involved, and as such he 
had a duty to them. He did not disclose that he was keeping any 
amount as a commission for the extension from that loan. 
Further, he did not even procure a loan. 
11. Plaintiffs also wrote a check to UTCO on October 3, 
2000, at the behest of H^ish, to further reduce the loan to UTCO. 
That was applied to reduce the UTCO loan. 
12. In November Huish advised that he almost had a long term 
replacement loan in place, that it should occur before 
Thanksgiving, and that plaintiffs should obtain another loan to 
cover the extension fees and interest through November and 
possible into December. The parties stipulated and the court 
finds that at that point in time, November, Huish was involved 
with a bank in Ogden and was attempting to secure long term 
financing for plaintiffs. In the meantime, because the balloon 
payment date had now been extended to November 1, 2000, Huish 
indicated to plaintiffs they should obtain another loan so 
another extension could be obtained. Huish found another lender, 
WaterPro, and arranged a loan to plaintiffs in the amount of 
$70,000 for plaintiffs. That closed November 3, 2000, and Huish 
prepared and brought all the closing documents to that closing 
8 
provision as plaintiffs testified. The court credits the 
testimony of plaintiffs and accords more weight to it than to the 
testimony of Huish, which was contrary to that understanding of 
plaintiff. Huish testified the document was clear, and he 
explained what those funds were for, namely, for the extension 
from November 1 to December 1, 2000. Of that amount given to 
Utah Funding, Huish then paid UTCO the sum of $9314 as an 
extension fee on November 6, 2000, and kept the remainder. Again, 
the court finds Huish had authority to extend the loan payment 
date on terms he desired and Huish took advantage of that and 
told plaintiffs an incomplete story. The court finds Huish had a 
duty to fully explain what that amount was for and he failed to 
do so. 
15. When no long term loan was forthcoming, UTCO through 
Huish advised that a $50,000 roll over or extension fee would be 
needed for December. The court again finds that, contrary to 
Huish' testimony, it was Huish' decision to set that amount as he 
had a relationship, ongoing, with UTCO where both UTCO and Huish 
could receive income from granting extensions. Huish became 
aware that plaintiffs had exhausted their borrowing ability from 
all their other properties, and plaintiffs could not meet that 
new extension fee requirement Huish set. Plaintiffs filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection December 6, 2000. They have 
since had the Beck street property repossessed, along with 
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and had the title company disburse the funds according to his 
direction. From that amount Huish received a commission of 
$4,900, and $13,977 went to Synergetic for interest on the UTCO 
loan. Synergetic is another business run by the principals of 
UTCO. That was done by Huish, inferentially at the behest of 
UTCO. Huish prepared the instructions for disbursement. The sum 
of $27,955.98 was listed on the closing document as "To Utah 
Funding and Loan, For 30 day Loan extension Beck Street.'' 
13. The court finds and concludes that document was net an 
integrated contract and was ambiguous as to at least what that 
term meant. Accordingly, the court received conditionally, and 
now considers, other evidence to determine the intent of the 
parties. 
14. The court finds Huish explained that amount was set 
aside to be held as needed in trust. A valid escrow account or 
trust was not created as there was no writing to that effect. 
However, the court does find that plaintiffs were told that if 
that amount was needed it would be held by Utah Funding to pay 
further extension fees or interest, or to pay commissions to 
Huish for his work in obtaining the long term financing, then 
those funds would be used for that purpose. If the funds were 
not used for those purposes they would be returned to plaintiffs. 
The provision is not clear from its language within the document 
as Huish asserts and the court finds Huish explained the 
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several other properties. 
16. Plaintiffs asked for the return of the money that was 
given to Utah Funding but Huish refused. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The disclosure statement is ambiguous and parol evidence 
was and is necessary to determine the intent of the parties 
concerning the WaterPro loan proceeds. 
2. Huish breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by 
failing to fully disclose that from the WaterPro loan proceeds he 
was taking a commission from those amounts. Huish did not 
disclose in any way what he was doing with those proceeds nor 
what extension was being sought. There are no documents other 
than the disclosure statement which Huish prepared, which is 
ambiguous, and which Huish did not explain except as found by the 
court. Huish said those funds would be held for other purposes 
and returned to plaintiffs if not need for those purposes. Huish 
benefitted himself at the expense of plaintiffs and his actions 
were not consistent with the duty he owed. Plaintiffs suffered 
damage. 
3. Conversion is an act of wilful interference with 
property, done without lawful justification, by which the person 
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entitled to property is deprived of its use and possession. 
Conversion deals with possession. Thus, the person claiming 
conversion, here plaintiffs, must prove that plaintiff was 
entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of 
the alleged conversion. Conversion must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The court concludes that when 
plaintiffs demanded the return of the WaterPro loan proceeds that 
were not used for extensions, Huish and defendants converted 
those funds. 
4. An escrow agreement must be in writing. There was not 
created an express trust. 
5. Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
Plaintiffs have not met that burden to prove that Huish committed 
fraud. 
6. Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or 
general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the defendant 
were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that 
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others. Willful and wanton misconduct 
is the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to 
do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences, and under 
such circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would 
know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high 
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degree of probability, result in harm to another. 
Punitive damages must be awarded in an amount that would be 
reasonable and proper as a punishment to the defendant for such 
wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to others not to offend in 
like manner. If such punitive damages are given, they should be 
awarded with caution. The court may consider the following 
factors, among others:(1) the relative wealth of the defendant; 
(2) the nature of the misconduct; (3) the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the misconduct; (4) the effect of the misconduct on 
the lives of others; (5) the likelihood of any recurrence of the 
conduct; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7) the amount 
of actual, or general or compensatory, damages. 
Here, the court concludes that the overall conduct of Huish 
was in reckless disregard of the rights of others and plaintiffs 
are entitled to punitive damages. On three occasions Huish kept 
a commission and failed to advise plaintiffs he was doing so. No 
documents explained that an extension fee was being charged. 
Huish had basically carte blanche authority to charge what he 
wanted for an extension yet he did not advise plaintiffs of the 
amount he was keeping as a commission. While Huish may do 
business that way, and perhaps has done so for the past fifteen 
years, and there was evidence that those involved in such loans 
"go by their own rules," and while such loans are a legitimate 
part of commerce and are needed and the risk is high, those in 
such a position need to fully reveal what the extension and roll 
over fees are for. It appears as if Huish intends to continue to 
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believe he acted properly. His attitude and demeanor at trial was 
clear to the court-he had done nothing improper, and charging 
fees without disclosing such was perfectly legitimate and was the 
was business was done. The court concludes Huish should pay 
punitive damages in the amounts of the commissions he kept on all 
loans except the original UTCO loan. That was a legitimate fee 
for finding a loan. The other fees may have been "legitimate" 
had they been disclosed. The court intends the punitive damage 
award to act as an incentive to Huish to reveal fully and 
completely in such matters that any extensions or roll over fees 
are indeed being charged not only by the lender but by the broker 
as well, 
7. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion in the amount of 
$18,643.98 plus statutory interest from December 1, 2000 through 
the date of judgment. 
8. Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in the amount 
of $50,000. The conduct was ongoing, harmed plaintiffs in a far 
greater amount than this damage award reveals, Huish was a 
fiduciary for plaintiffs and had a high duty toward them, Huish' 
attitude was one of defiance and thus is likely to recur in an 
ongoing basis, and while there was no testimony as to the 
relative wealth of Huish, he obtained fees from plaintiffs in an 
amount over $100,000 for conducing business with UTCO with whom 
he had an insider relationship. The amount is probably very 
generous to Huish and could easily be more. The court finds his 
conduct most outrageous. 
Plaintiff is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
"7 <7 ^"/;/-
DATED this ^  / day of / -^l y- , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
c- U -- i 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA7 Rule 53 for 
rules regarding the citation of unpublished 
opinions.) 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
Robert MIGUEL and Jean Miguel, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Raymond J. BELZESKI, Individually and as 
Administrator of the Estate of Raymond 
J. Bell, et al., Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 94-3389. 
Argued Oct. 24, 1995. 
Decided Nov. 29, 1995. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 1995. 
Appeal from the United States District Court, for 
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 
No. 90 C 6054; Paul E. Plunkett, Judge. 
N.D.lll. 
AFFIRMED. 
were joint owners of a vacant, unimproved lot in 
Chicago (hereinafter the "property"). In order to 
obtain issuance of the bail bond, it was apparently 
agreed that Mr. Miguel would give Cosentino 
$5,000 together with quitclaim deeds to the 
property. In April, 1975, the Miguels each 
executed separate quitclaim deeds in favor of 
Raymond Bell as instructed by Cosentino. The 
deeds were given to Cosentino and thereafter it 
appears that a bail bond was issued by the Imperial 
Insurance Company via Bell. Although the bail 
bond was never forfeited, the quitclaim deeds were 
not returned to the Miguels. Rather, it appears that 
the deeds were delivered to Bell and were recorded 
in September, 1975. Over the years, the property 
has been conveyed down the line of the defendants. 
The property has since been developed and as of 
June 1993, allegedly had a fair market value of 
approximately $620,000. 
The original complaint in this case was filed in 
October, 1990. The Miguels most recently alleged 
in their Fifth Amended Complaint that the deeds 
were executed and deposited with Cosentino solely 
as collateral for the bail bond and that the deeds 
were not to be delivered to Bell except upon 
forfeiture of the bail bond. The Miguels further 
alleged that by depositing the deeds with Cosentino 
they never intended to transfer, deliver or pass title 
to Bell. They seek monetary damages against 
certain defendants as well as a determination that 
title be quieted in favor of plaintiffs and that all 
claims and interests of defendants in the property be 
canceled and removed. 
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE and ROVNER, 
Circuit Judges. 
ORDER 
**1 The chain of events producing this diversity 
litigation [FN1] dates back to 1975 when Robert 
Miguel decided to procure a bail bond on behalf of 
an arrested relative from bondsman James 
Cosentino. [FN2] At that time, Robert Miguel and 
his wife Jean Miguel (hereinafter the "Miguels") 
The district court granted summary judgment 
[FN3] on behalf of all defendants, concluding that 
the Miguels had not raised a genuine issue with 
regard to the ambiguity of the deeds and had failed 
to designate specific facts demonstrating a genuine 
issue with regard to the existence of a writing 
evidencing the escrow agreement that would satisfy 
the Illinois Statute of Frauds (hereinafter "Statute"). 
[FN4] We agree with the district judge's 
conclusions, as evidenced in his Memorandum 
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Opinion and Order, which is attached Miguel v 
Beheski 1993 WL 460847 (N D 111, Nov 5, 1993) 
We separately address the Miguels' arguments not 
addressed by the district court 
On appeal, the Miguels first argue that the district 
court erred by failing to credit the deposition 
testimony of Mr Miguel as constituting a sworn 
statement setting forth the existence and terms of 
the agreement between Miguel and Cosentino 
sufficient to satisfy the Statute This argument 
must fail Defendants point out that the Miguels did 
not contend in the district court that the deposition 
testimony of Mr Miguel was sufficient to satisfy the 
Statute and that this issue has therefore been 
waived However, the district court specifically 
found that "[n]o affidavit, deposition testimony, or 
admission suggests that such a writing exists" 
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 
4, 1993, p 15 This finding suggests that the 
district court reviewed the record on its own 
initiative to determine whether or not summary 
judgment was appropriate Although we therefore 
find that this issue was not waived, an examination 
of the excerpted deposition testimony relied upon 
by the Miguels fails to clearly demonstrate the 
existence of a writing, its terms, or that it was 
signed by either Cosentino or Bell 
**2 For their second argument, plaintiffs contend 
that the district court erred by failing to recognize 
that Cosentino fraudulently breached his fiduciary 
duty as escrowee to the Miguels and that the 
defendants thereby had the burden of demonstrating 
the validity of the transaction Defendants contend 
that this argument on appeal was also waived as not 
presented to the district court The Miguels' 
second argument hinges on the existence of a valid 
escrow agreement As the Miguels have run afoul 
of the Statute and have thereby failed to 
demonstrate a genuine issue as to the existence of 
the escrow agreement, we need not address the 
second issue or determine whether or not it has been 
waived 
The judgment below is affirmed 
ATTACHMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
Page 2 
EASTERN DIVISION 
Robert Miguel and Jean Miguel, Plaintiffs, 
v 
Raymond J Belzeski, individually and as 
Administrator of the Estate of Rayrrond 
J Bell, deceased, Mark Richardson Bell, Holly 
Mills, Kirk Daniel Bell, 
Chicago Title and Trust Company, as Trustee under 
Trust No 9529, John J 
Lag, First Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trusiee under 
Trust 9529, Theodore A 
Wynn, Lawrence J Oakford, NBD Trust 
Company of Illinois, as Trustee under 
Trust 6018, Harris Bank/Glencoe-Northbrook, 
N A , and Unknown Owners, 
Defendants 
No 90 C 6054 
Docketed Nov 3, 1993 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
PLUNKETT, District Judge 
This case is before us on Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment In separate motions, 
Defendants NBD Trust Company of Illinois, as 
Trustee ("NBD") and Harris Bank of 
Glencoe-Northbrook, N A ("Harris Bank"), and 
Defendants Raymond Belzeski, Mark Richardson 
Bell, Holly Mills, and Kirk Daniel Bell 
(collectively, the "Bell Heirs defendants") are 
seeking summary judgment against Plaintiffs Robert 
Miguel and Jean Miguel (the "Miguels") of 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint For the 
reasons stated below, we grant both motions and 
dismiss Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint as 
again st those Defendants [FN 1 ] 
Background 
As this Court noted in its July 13, 1992, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, (Memorandum 
Opinion and Order at 2, Miguel v Belzeski, No 90 
C 60M (N D III July 13, 1992) (Plunkett, J )), this 
action arises out of a series of events that trace back 
to April 1975 It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff 
Robert Miguel contacted a bail bondsman named 
James Cosentino at American Bonding Company in 
early 1975 to obtain a bond for a relative 
According to Plaintiff Robert Miguel, at the time he 
dealt uith Cosentino he believed Cosentino was " 
'the brains of the outfit' " and " 'the head of the 
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company.'" (Pis.' First Rule 12(n) Stmt. % 2.) 
Mr. Miguel agreed to give Cosentino $5000 and a 
quitclaim deed to a piece of property owned by 
Plaintiffs (the "Property") in return for issuance of a 
$25,000 bond for Mr. Miguel's relative. [FN2] 
Plaintiffs executed quitclaim deeds on the Property 
in favor of a Raymond Bell on or about April 24, 
1975. [FN3] (Defs.' Rule 12(m) Stmt. K 1.) It is 
uncontroverted at this point that the deeds were 
deposited with James Cosentino and not given 
directly to Bell by the Miguels. Imperial Insurance 
Company issued the bond through Raymond Bell, 
who had been appointed as Imperial's 
attorney-in-fact for purposes of issuing the bond. 
(Pis/ Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ.J., Group Exh. 
Al.) 
**3 According to Plaintiffs, the deeds were 
intended solely as collateral for the bond. [FN4] 
(Fifth Am.CompI. at f 14.) They allege that 
Cosentino was not to deliver the deeds to Bell 
unless the bond was forfeited. (Id) Plaintiffs 
maintain that they never intended to transfer title to 
Bell or effect a delivery of the deeds to Bell by 
depositing the deeds with Cosentino. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs have not produced a written agreement or 
any writing evidencing the condition allegedly 
attached to the transfer of the Property or the 
alleged escrow arrangement between Plaintiffs and 
Cosentino. The deeds themselves do not refer to 
any conditions or the existence of an extrinsic 
agreement. (Fifth Am.CompI., Exhs. A & B.) 
Plaintiffs allege that there are other documents but 
only those recorded in Cook County can be located. 
(Pis.'Rule 12(n) Stmt, at H 15.) 
The bond was never forfeited. (Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' 
Mots, for Summ.J., Group Exh. A.) Nonetheless, 
the deeds were delivered to Bell at some time prior 
to September 1975. Bell recorded the deeds in 
September 1975. [FN5] 
Raymond Bell died intestate in Indiana in 1981. 
(Fifth Am.CompI. at ^ 18.) The Property passed 
to Defendants Bell Heirs. They conveyed the 
Property in 1989 to Defendant Chicago Title & 
Trust Company, as Trustee ("CT & T"), (Fifth 
Am.CompI. at f 19), who then conveyed it to 
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Defendant First Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trustee 
("First Illinois"). (Id at % 20.) First Illinois 
conveyed the Property to Defendant NBD as 
Trustee in February 1990. (Fifth Am.CompI. at % 
21; Defs.' Mem.Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Aff. of 
Michael A. Bentcover at 1 3.) In March 1990, 
Defendant NBD borrowed money from Defendant 
Harris Bank to develop the property and granted 
Defendant Harris Bank a mortgage interest in the 
Property. [FN6] (Fifth Am.CompI. at fl 22.) 
Plaintiffs apparently continued to be billed by 
Cook County until 1989 for the real estate taxes due 
on the Property. (Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for 
Summ. J., Group Exh. B.) According to receipts 
and real estate tax bills submitted by Plaintiffs in 
response to Defendants' NBD and Harris Bank 
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs paid real 
estate taxes on the Property for the years 1974- 75, 
and 1978-1989. [FN7] (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that 
they did not become aware of the fact that Bell had 
obtained the deeds and recorded them until late 
1980 or early 1990. (Fifth Am.CompI. at % 28.) 
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in October 
1990. That complaint sought to quiet title and 
named CT & T, Harris Bank, and NBD as 
defendants. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended 
Complaint on November 12, 1991, naming Mark 
Bell, Holly Mills, Raymond Belzeski, and Kirk Bell 
as Defendants. In that complaint, Plaintiffs sought 
to recover damages for the sale of the property 
rather than to quiet title. 
The Defendants in the Second Amended Complaint 
sought summary judgment on four grounds: (1) the 
fact that the quitclaim deeds were unconditional on 
their face rendered the conveyance to Raymond 
Bell absolute at law; (2) no fraud claim existed 
against Raymond Bell because Plaintiffs dealt 
exclusively with Cosentino and hence Plaintiffs had 
no derivative claim against Raymond Bell's heirs; 
(3) any claim that Plaintiffs might have had was 
extinguished by the Indiana nonclaim statute; and 
(4) Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the Illinois statute 
of limitations. The Court denied the motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the 
validity of the delivery of the deed was a material 
issue of fact; and (2) the Plaintiffs' due diligence in 
discovering the fraud was a material issue of fact in 
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determining whether or not the running of the 
Illinois statute of limitations was tolled. 
**4 Plaintiffs filed a Fifth Amended Complaint in 
April of 1993. The Fifth Amended Complaint 
named as Defendants Raymond J. Belzeski, Mark 
Richardson Bell, Holly Mills, Kirk Daniel Bell 
(collectively, the "Bell Heirs"), Chicago Title & 
Trust Company, as Trustee, John J. Lag, [FN8] First 
Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trustee, Theodore A. 
Wynn, [FN9] Lawrence J. Oakford, [FN 10] NBD 
Trust Company of Illinois, Harris 
Bank/Glencoe-Northbrook, N.A., and unknown 
owners. Count I of the Fifth Amended Complaint 
seeks damages of $75,000 against Defendants Bell 
Heirs. Count II apparently seeks to quiet title as 
against all titleholders in the chain of title 
subsequent to the Bell Heirs. [FN11] 
Defendants NBD and Harris Bank filed a motion 
for summary judgment as to Count II of the Fifth 
Amended Complaint on July 30, 1993. They move 
for summary judgment on four grounds: (1) 
Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the Illinois Statute of 
Frauds; (2) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by laches; (3) 
Plaintiffs passed good title to Raymond Bell 
because the deeds are absolute as a matter of law; 
and (4) Defendants NBD and Harris Bank are 
protected as a matter of law as bona fide purchasers. 
Defendants Bell Heirs filed a motion for summary 
judgment as to Count I of the Fifth Amended 
Complaint on July 23, 1993. They, like 
Defendants NBD and Harris Bank, move for 
summary judgment on statute of frauds and good 
title grounds. They also seek summary judgment 
on the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by 
the nonclaim statute of the Indiana Probate Code; 
and (2) Count I is barred by the five-year Illinois 
Statute of Limitations. 
Analysis 
For Defendants to prevail on a motion for summary 
judgment, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with affidavits, if any [must] show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the nonmovant bears 
the burden of proof on a dispositive issue, "the 
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nonmoving party [is required] to go beyond the 
pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 
'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 417 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The issue is "whether a 
proper jury question is presented." Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
If a condition to the effectiveness of a deed does 
not appear on the face of such deed, the deed 
becomes absolute at law when delivered unless 
delivery is made in escrow to a third person. Loque 
v. yon Almen, 40 N.E.2d 73, 77 (111.1941). Under 
Illinois law, an escrow is established "when a deed 
is deposited by a grantor with a third person and 
that person is to deliver the deed to the grantee only 
upon the fulfillment of some condition." LaSalle 
Nat'l Bank v. Kissane, 516 N.E.2d 790, 792 
(III.App.Ct.1987). 
**5 When the conveyance is contingent on the 
occurrence of some event, title is not conveyed 
when the deed is delivered into escrow. Fairbwy 
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Bank of 111, 462 N.E.2d 
6, 9 (III.App.1984). Furthermore, no title is 
conveyed if there is an unauthorized delivery of the 
deed by the escrow agent to the grantee. Id. In 
other words, title does not pass to the grantee if the 
escrow agent delivers the deed to the grantee prior 
to the occurrence of the designated condition. 
The parties here agree that the Migueis did not 
deliver the deeds directly to Bell, the grantee. The 
Migueis delivered them to Cosentino. As a result, 
"the general presumption in favor of unconditional 
delivery does not apply." (Mem.Op. and Order at 7, 
Miguel v. Belzeski, No. 90 C 6054 (N.D.II1 July 13, 
1993) (Plunkett, J.).) Thus, as we noted in our July 
13, 1993 order, the validity of the conveyance to 
Bell turns on the issue of whether there was proper 
delivery of the deeds. {Id. at 10.) That issue in 
turn depends on whether or not an escrow was 
established when the Migueis delivered the deeds to 
Cosentino. 
According to the Migueis, Cosentino was not to 
deliver the deeds to Bell unless the bond issued 
through Bell's efforts was forfeited. They claim 
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that title did not transfer to Bell because the deed 
was delivered to Bell even though the required 
event-the forfeiture of the bond-never occurred. 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of the validity of the 
conveyance to Bell on several grounds. They 
argue first that Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the 
Illinois Statute of Frauds, 740 ILCS 80/2. They 
argue alternatively that no valid escrow 
arrangement exists because Cosentino does not 
qualify under Illinois law as a third-party escrowee. 
Finally, they argue that the conveyance was valid 
because the deeds themselves are unambiguous and 
unconditional and are absolute as a matter of law in 
the absence of a valid escrow arrangement. 
In order to defeat this portion of Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue either with 
regard to the existence of an escrow or with regard 
to the ambiguous nature of the deeds themselves. 
With regard to the alleged escrow arrangement, 
Plaintiffs must show that there is a genuine issue (1) 
that the deed was delivered to an person who could 
qualify as a third-party escrowee under Illinois law; 
and (2) that delivery of the deed was subject to an 
extrinsic condition. Because Plaintiffs bear the 
burden of proof with regard to these issues, 
Plaintiffs may not rest on the pleadings but must by 
"affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 
'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial.' " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. at 324 
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 
In response to Defendants' motions, Plaintiffs argue 
that the deeds are ambiguous as a result of certain 
tax exemption stamps that were affixed on them. 
According to Plaintiffs 
**6 [t]he ambiguity is two-fold. First, although 
the deeds are for the same property, it is unclear 
whether the same exemption sections were 
applicable to each deed. Second, if paragraph c 
applies, then the deeds were not unconditional on 
their face because they were stated to "secure 
debt or other obligation." 
Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. 
Plaintiffs maintain, without citation to any statute or 
caselaw to support their argument, that the 
PaeeS 
referenced sections of the Illinois Real Estate 
Transfer Tax Act and the Chicago Transaction 
Code are "incorporated into and must be interpreted 
as part of the plain language of the deeds as 
recorded." Id. 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is a 
genuine issue of fact with regard to the nature of the 
deeds themselves. Three of the four stamps are 
legible, and reference exemptions based on the 
amount of consideration. One of the deeds, the one 
executed by Mr. Miguel, is stamped with consistent 
stamps. Plaintiffs have not offered any explanation 
as to why Bell might have referenced two different 
exemptions on the other deed when it conveyed the 
same piece of property. 
Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Rule 
56(e) with respect to the nature of the deeds. They 
did not produce evidence beyond their own 
allegations to support their contention that the deeds 
are ambiguous. As a result, they must demonstrate 
a genuine issue with regard to the existence of an 
escrow arrangement to withstand Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment on the issue of valid 
delivery. 
Assuming that Cosentino qualifies as a valid 
third-party escrowee under Illinois law, [FN 12] 
Plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of a valid 
escrow arrangement in order to prevail at trial. The 
question raised by Defendants' motions is whether 
they must do so by producing some writing 
memorializing the arrangement. 
Defendants maintain that, because Plaintiffs' claim 
revolves around the conveyance of land, any 
extrinsic condition or agreement must be in writing 
to be enforceable by Plaintiffs. According to 
Defendants, in the absence of a writing evidencing 
the alleged escrow arrangement between the 
Miguels and Cosentino the Court must look to the 
deeds alone. 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, Illinois law requires 
that the escrow arrangement be evidenced by a 
writing. The Illinois statute of frauds provides that 
an action for the sale of land cannot be maintained 
unless the contract or some memorandum or note 
thereof is in writing, signed by the party to be 
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charged. 740 ILCS 80/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, this 
requirement applies to escrow arrangements such as 
the one here. 
In order that an instrument may operate as an 
escrow when delivered to one not a party to the 
instrument, to be delivered in turn, to a party to 
the instrument upon the performance of certain 
conditions, there must be a valid contract between 
the parties as to the subject-matter [sic] of the 
instrument.... [T]o meet the requirements of 
section 2 of the statute of frauds, no form of 
language is necessary, if only the intention can be 
gathered, and that any kind of writing, from a 
solemn deed down to mere hasty notes or 
memoranda in books, papers, or letters will 
suffice, but the writings, notes, or memoranda 
must contain on their face, or by reference to 
others, the names of the parties, vendor and 
vendee, a sufficiently clear and explicit 
description of the property to render it capable of 
being identified from other property of like kind, 
together with the terms, conditions (if any), and 
price to be paid or other consideration to be 
given, and such writing must be signed by the 
party to be charged.... 
**7 Johnson v. Walden, 173 N.E. 790, 792 
(111.1930). 
Proof of an oral agreement conditioning the 
delivery of title and establishing an escrow 
arrangement is not enough. See, e.g., Hubbard v. 
Schumaker, 402 N.E.2d 857 (llI.App.1980). In 
Hubbard, Plaintiff sought to impose a constructive 
trust on an interest in property that she had 
conveyed to her brother. She maintained that "she 
signed over her one-quarter interest to her brother 
so he could borrow money." Hubbard v. 
Schumaker, 402 N.E.2d at 859. She further alleged 
that he had orally promised to " 'make it right' for 
her." Id. at 859-860. The court held that any oral 
agreement to reconvey the property "would have 
been void under the Statute of Frauds." Id. at 861. 
The situation here is analogous in all material 
respects. The deeds executed in favor of Bell do 
not indicate the existence of a condition. The 
deeds were delivered to the grantee. The 
conveyance of title allegedly was conditioned on 
the occurrence of a certain event, here, the 
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forfeiture of the bond. Thus, according to the 
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard, 
Plaintiffs can only prevail on their claim if they are 
able to prove the existence of some writing 
evidencing the alleged escrow arrangement with 
Cosentino and Bell. Even if Plaintiffs were able to 
prove the existence of an oral agreement, that would 
not be enough under the Statute of Frauds. 
There are reasons for the Statute of Frauds 
requirement. Without such a rule governing 
conveyances of land, parties to such transactions 
could attempt to unravel them many years later by 
alleging the existence of an oral agreement 
contradicting the absolute language of the deed 
itself. The trier of fact would have absolutely no 
way of ascertaining the substance of the agreement. 
The problem is well-illusirated here. The alleged 
oral agreement between the Miguels and 
Cosentino/Bell was entered into over eighteen years 
ago. Bell is long dead and Cosentino cannot be 
found. The deed may have been delivered solely to 
secure the bond-in which case it should have been 
returned to the Miguels when the bond was not 
forfeited-or it may have been delivered as part of 
the premium for the bond-in which case Bell was 
entitled to the property and rightfully recorded the 
deed. Without some sort of writing evidencing the 
agreement, there is simply no way for the Court or 
the trier of fact to know the truth. 
The operative condition need not appear on the 
face of the deed to create a valid escrow. Because 
such a condition concerns the delivery of the deed, 
not the efficacy of the deed itself, it is immaterial 
whether the condition appears on the face of the 
deed or is contained in an extrinsic agreement. 
Tiffany, Real Property § 1048 (3d ed. 1975). 
Delivery to a third party creates an exception to the 
parol evidence rule. Ballantine, "Delivery in 
Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule," 29 Yale L.J 
826, 827 (1920). Thus, Plaintiffs may prove the 
existence of the condition, and hence, the existence 
of an escrow arrangement, by extrinsic evidence. 
**8 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have not introduced the 
evidence necessary to defeat Defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. No writing of any sort 
evidencing the alleged escrow agreement has been 
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produced in response to Defendants' motions The 
deeds themselves cannot serve as the writing 
because they do not reference the condition No 
affidavit, deposition testimony, or admission 
suggests that such writing exists [FN 13] 
Conclusion 
Plaintiffs have not introduced the evidence 
necessary to demonstrate that there is an issue that 
must go to a jury They have not raised a genuine 
issue with regard to the ambiguity of the deeds 
Taken by themselves, the deeds appear absolute at 
law and do not support Plaintiffs' claim that the 
conveyance to Bell was invalid Plaintiffs' claim 
thus depends on the existence of a written extrinsic 
agreement conditioning the delivery of the deed to 
Bell While the uncontroverted evidence regarding 
the delivery to Cosentino does raise an issue 
regarding the existence of an escrow agreement, 
Plaintiffs have failed to designate specific facts that 
show that there is a genuine issue with regard to the 
existence of a writing evidencing that agreement 
Plaintiffs' claim cannot stand 
Plaintiffs will no doubt feel that this result is harsh 
Nonetheless, the Court is not free to disregard 
Illinois law, and under Illinois law an escrow 
agreement such as the one alleged here must be in 
writing to be enforceable As Plaintiffs have 
produced no evidence that suggests that such a 
writing exists, Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment are hereby granted [FN 14] 
DATED November 4, 1993 
FN1 The district court's jurisdiction was 
conferred by 28 U S C § 1332(a)(1) 
FN2 Additional background information 
is set forth in prior proceedings in this case 
reported at Miguel v Belzeski, 797 F Supp 
636 (NDII1, 1992) as well as m the 
district court's Memorandum Opinion and 
Order granting summary judgment 
Miguel v Belzeski, 1993 WL 460847 
FN3 The district court's Memorandum 
Opinion and Order dated November 4, 
1993 and docketed November 5, 1993 
granted summary judgment to some but 
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not all defendants Additional defendants 
were granted summary judgment on 
December 3, 1993 for the same reasons as 
those stated in the district courts 
November 4, 1993 opinion, and a Rule 58 
Judgment was docketed on December 8, 
1993 A Rule 59(e) Motion filed by the 
Miguels was stricken as untimely on 
January 19, 1994 and a notice of appeal 
was filed on February 17, 1994 (No 
94-1422) Upon subsequent consideration 
of jurisdictional memoranda filed by the 
parties and a motion to dismiss for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction, this court dismissed 
the Miguels' appeal as premature, it 
appearing that the district court's judgment 
did not dispose of the Miguels' claims 
against all defendants In subsequent 
proceedings, the district court granted a 
motion to amend the December 8, 1993 
judgment to include Chicago Title and 
Trust, and a Rule 58 Judgment was 
docketed on September 9, 1994 The 
Miguels' Motion to Reconsider was denied 
by the district court on October 5, 1994, 
and a notice of appeal was filed on 
October 11, 1994 Appellate jurisdiction 
is conferred by 29 U S C § 1291 
FN4 740 ILCS 80/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) 
FN1 The Court does not, by this order 
dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint as ro 
the remaining Defendants, namely, First 
Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trustee, 
Theodore A Wynn and Lawrence J 
Oakford, as beneficial owners of the First 
Illinois Trust, and unknown owners 
FN2 The Property is located in Cook 
County, Illinois (Defs' Rule 12(m) Stmt H 
3) at 1512 West Diversey Avenue, 
Chicago, Illinois (Pis' First Rule 12(n) 
Stmt U 3 ) At the time the deed was 
delivered to Cosentino, the Property was 
an unimproved vacant lot 
FN3 Because the Property was held 
jointly by Mr and Mrs Miguel, they each 
executed a quitclaim deed to the Property 
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FN4. Plaintiffs do not offer an explanation 
of why the deeds were executed in favor of 
Bell rather than Cosentino when it was 
Cosentino who they approached for the 
bond. 
FN5. As noted in the Court's July 13, 1992 
Order each of the recorded deeds have two 
exemption stamps signed by Raymond Bell 
on them, one indicating an exemption from 
state tax and one indicating an exemption 
from city tax (Mem.Op. and Order at 2-3 
& n. 4, Miguel v. Belzeski, No. 90 C 6054 
(N.D.I11. July 13, 1992) (Plunkett, J.).) 
FN6. Defendant NBD alleges that it has 
developed the Property extensively since 
acquiring it in 1990. (Bentcover Affidavit 
at % 7.) According to NBD, the Property 
was acquired by NBD in 1990 for 
approximately $97,500. (Id at fl 4.) 
NBD alleges that the Property currently 
has a fair market value of approximately 
$620,000. (Id at J 7.) 
FN7. According to those records, taxes for 
the periods of 1974-75 and 1978-84 were 
not paid by Plaintiffs when due, but were 
redeemed by Plaintiffs in January and 
February 1989. (Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mots, 
for Summ. J., Group Exh. B.) Plaintiffs 
allege that they also paid the real estate 
taxes on the Property for 1976-1977. The 
Court is unable to confirm that fact from 
the records submitted by Plaintiffs. 
FN8. Lag is named as the beneficial owner 
of Trust 1092665 held by Defendant CT & 
T. 
FN9. Wynn is named as beneficial owner 
of Trust 9529 held by Trustee First Illinois 
Bank and Trust. 
FN 10. Oakford is named as beneficial 
owner of Trust 9529 held by Trustee First 
Illinois Bank and Trust. 
FN 11. The complaint does not specify 
clearly the relief sought by Plaintiffs, but 
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states that 
25. Defendants unlawfully claim and have 
claimed title to said property by virtue of 
subsequent deeds and instruments executed 
and delivered at said times set forth above. 
26. The claims of defendants are invalid 
for the reasons that said deeds and trusts 
were based on ineffective instruments as 
said property was never legally delivered 
nor transferred to Raymond J. Bell; and 
thus, all subsequent transfers are of no 
effect. 
28. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at 
law as the subject matter of this action is 
unique real estate. 
(Fifth Am.CompI. at ffi 25, 26, 28.) 
FN 12. Defendants argue that Cosentino 
does not qualify as a third party escrowee 
under Illinois law. Because we conclude 
that the Statute of Frauds bars Plaintiffs' 
claim regardless of Cosentino's 
qualifications as an escrowee, we need not 
reach that issue. 
FN 13. Plaintiffs' Local Rule 12(n) 
statement contains a vague allegation that 
"[t]here were other documents executed by 
the Miguels regarding the transaction that 
is the subject of the Complaint; however, 
only copies of documents recorded in 
Cook County can be located." (Pis.* First 
Rule 12(n) Stmt, at K 15.) The statement 
does not specify the identify of the "other 
documents." It does not describe their 
contents. It does not indicate that the 
documents were signed by either 
Cosentino or Bell. Even if such a 
statement could be considered under Rule 
56(e), it would be inadequate to raise a 
genuine issue of fact. 
We note that it would not have been 
difficult for Plaintiffs to overcome the 
Statute of Frauds problem if in fact the 
necessary writing had existed. If the facts 
are as alleged (i.e., that the writing existed 
but had been lost), Plaintiffs could have 
submitted a sworn statement attesting to 
the fact that Bell had signed an agreement 
that provided that the deeds were only to 
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be delivered if the bond were forfeited, but 
that the agreement was lost. While we 
express no judgment as to whether such 
evidence would have carried the day in 
front of a jury, it certainly would have 
been sufficient to show that there was a 
genuine issue for trial. 
FN 14. Because the Court concludes that 
Defendants' are entitled to summary 
judgment on Statute of Frauds grounds, the 
Court does not reach the issue of whether 
Plaintiffs' claim is barred by laches, the 
Illinois statute of limitations, or the 
nonclaim statute of the Indiana Probate 
Code, or the issue of whether Defendants 
NBD and Harris Bank are protected as 
bona fide purchasers. 
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